CVE-2026-4873
connection reuse ignores TLS requirement
Project curl Security Advisory, April 29 2026 Permalink
VULNERABILITY
A vulnerability exists where a connection requiring TLS incorrectly reuses an existing unencrypted connection from the same connection pool. If an initial transfer is made in clear-text (via IMAP, SMTP, or POP3), a subsequent request to that same host bypasses the TLS requirement and instead transmit data unencrypted.
INFO
This flaw requires a rather special series of events to trigger. Such a series is unlikely to be used much in the wild.
This issue only happens for transfers done using IMAP://, POP3:// or SMTP:// URL schemes. The initial transfer and the second transfer both need to be done to the same host, use the same credentials and the same URL schemes. The login and the initial
transfer is done over clear-text, so the user is obviously already accepting an insecure transmission for this. This flaw still makes it worse as the second transfer is intended to be secured by TLS but is not.
The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has assigned the name CVE-2026-4873 to this issue.
CWE-319: Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information
Severity: Low
AFFECTED VERSIONS
- Affected versions: curl 7.20.0 to and including 8.19.0
- Not affected versions: curl < 7.20.0 and >= 8.20.0
- Introduced-in: https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/ec3bb8f727405642a
libcurl is used by many applications, but not always advertised as such!
This bug is not considered a C mistake. It is not likely to have been avoided had we not been using C.
This flaw also affects the curl command line tool.
SOLUTION
curl 8.20.0 fixes this logical flaw
RECOMMENDATIONS
We suggest you take one of the following actions immediately, in order of preference:
A - Upgrade to curl and libcurl 8.20.0
B - Apply the patch and rebuild libcurl
C - Do not use clear-text IMAP/POP3/SMTP transfers
TIMELINE
It was reported to the curl project on March 22 2026. We contacted distros@openwall on April 23.
libcurl 8.20.0 was released on April 29 2026, coordinated with the publication of this advisory.
CREDITS
- Reported-by: Arkadi Vainbrand
- Patched-by: Daniel Stenberg
Thanks a lot!