Verify
Do not trust, verify!
Signed releases
Every curl release is shipped as a set of tarballs. They all have the exact same content but use different archivers, visible by the different file extensions used.
Each tarball is signed by the curl release manager Daniel. The digital signatures for each tarball are always provided. The digital signatures can be used to verify that the tarballs were produced by Daniel.
If the curl website were breached and fake curl releases were provided, they could be detected using these signatures.
Daniel's public GPG key: 27ED EAF2 2F3A BCEB 50DB 9A12 5CC9 08FD B71E 12C2
Reproducible releases
The curl project ships reproducible releases. This means that everyone is able - and encouraged - to independently verify the contents of every curl release. Verify that it contains exactly the bits that are supposed to be in the release and nothing extra.
The curl releases are generated using a Docker image to make it easy to get an identical setup. To verify an existing curl release, we provide a convenient script that generates a new curl release from source code and then compares this newly generated release tarball with the tarball file you downloaded from curl.se.
Invoke it like this:
./scripts/verify-release curl-8.19.0.tar.xz
By verifying the release tarballs, you verify that Daniel does not infect the release on purpose or involuntarily because of anything malicious running in his setup.
Verify the verify
Of course you should not blindly trust the verification script. It is short and simple and should be quick to verify. Or you write your own script that you trust, to do the same job.
Source code
How do you then verify that what is in git is fine to build a product from?
In the curl project we verify the source code in multiple ways, and one way to gain trust is to verify and review our testing procedures.
we have a consistent code style (invalid style causes errors)
we ban and avoid a number of "sensitive" and "hard-to-use" C functions (use of such functions causes errors)
we have a ceiling for complexity in functions to keep them easy to follow, read and understand (failing to do so causes errors)
we review all pull requests before merging, both with humans and with bots. We link back commits to their origin pull requests in commit messages.
we ban use of "binary blobs" in git to not provide means for malicious actors to bundle encrypted payloads (trying to include a blob causes errors)
we actively avoid base64 encoded chunks as they too could function as ways to obfuscate malicious contents
we ban most uses of UTF-8 in code and documentation to avoid easily mixed up Unicode characters that look like other characters. (adding Unicode characters causes errors)
we document everything to make it clear how things are supposed to work. No surprises. Lots of documentation is tested and verified in addition to spellchecks and consistent wording.
we have thousands of tests and we add test cases for (ideally) every functionality. Finding "white spots" and adding coverage is a top priority. curl runs on countless operating systems, CPU architectures and you can build curl in billions of different configuration setups: not every combination is practically possible to test
we build curl and run tests in over two hundred CI jobs that are run for every commit and every PR. We do not merge commits that have unexplained test failures.
we build curl in CI with the most picky compiler options enabled and we never allow compiler warnings to linger. We always use
-Werrorthat converts warnings to errors and fail the builds.we run all tests using valgrind and several combinations of sanitizers to find and reduce the risk for memory problems, undefined behavior and similar
we run all tests as "torture tests", where each test case is rerun to have every invoked fallible function call fail once each, to make sure curl never leaks memory or crashes due to this.
we run fuzzing on curl: non-stop as part of Google's OSS-Fuzz project, but also briefly as part of the CI setup for every commit and PR
we make sure that the CI jobs we have for curl never "write back" to curl. They access the source repository read-only and even if they would be breached, they cannot infect or taint source code.
we run
zizmorand other code analyzer tools on the CI job config scripts to reduce the risk of us running or using insecure CI jobs.we are committed to always fix reported vulnerabilities in the following release. Security problems never linger around once they have been reported.
we document everything and every detail about all curl vulnerabilities ever reported
our commitment to never breaking ABI or API allows all users to easily upgrade to new releases. This enables users to run recent security-fixed versions instead of legacy insecure versions.
our code has been audited several times by external security experts, and the few issues that have been detected in those were immediately addressed
Two-factor authentication on GitHub is mandatory for all committers