SSL out of buffer access
Project curl Security Advisory, November 29th 2017 - Permalink
libcurl contains an out boundary access flaw in SSL related code.
When allocating memory for a connection (the internal struct called
connectdata), a certain amount of memory is allocated at the end of the struct to be used for SSL related structs. Those structs are used by the particular SSL library libcurl is built to use. The application can also tell libcurl which specific SSL library to use if it was built to support more than one.
The math used to calculate the extra memory amount necessary for the SSL library was wrong on 32 bit systems, which made the allocated memory too small by 4 bytes. The last struct member of the last object within the memory area could then be outside of what was allocated. Accessing that member could lead to a crash or other undefined behaviors depending on what memory that is present there and how the particular SSL library decides to act on that memory content.
Specifically the vulnerability is present if libcurl was built so that
sizeof(long long *) < sizeof(long long) which as far as we are aware only happens in 32-bit builds.
The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has assigned the name CVE-2017-8818 to this issue.
CWE-125: Out-of-bounds Read
This is only an issue on systems with 32 bit pointers. (Technically, on systems where
sizeof(long long *) < sizeof(long long).)
- Affected versions: libcurl 7.56.0 to and including 7.56.1
- Not affected versions: libcurl < 7.56.0 and >= 7.57.0
- Introduced-in: https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/70f1db321a
curl is used by many applications, but not always advertised as such.
In libcurl version 7.57.0, the allocation size is corrected.
We suggest you take one of the following actions immediately, in order of preference:
A - Upgrade curl to version 7.57.0
B - Apply the patch to your version and rebuild
It was reported to the curl project on November 18, 2017. We contacted distros@openwall on November 24.
curl 7.57.0 was released on November 29 2017, coordinated with the publication of this advisory.
(The original report was made in public)
- Reported-by: John Schoenick
- Patched-by: Ray Satiro
Thanks a lot!